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NETWORKING CUSTOMARY LAW
Scott Sullivan∗
ABSTRACT
In United States v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
gathering four weeks of GPS information capturing a suspect’s movement on
public roads constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.1
In two separate concurring opinions, Justices Alito and Sotomayor
rejected the notion that all of a citizen’s movements in public were free from
the Amendment’s protection.2 A unifying theme for both justices was the
power of contemporary technology to aggregate isolated acts into a
comprehensive knowledge of a person’s private life. Justice Alito writing on
behalf of four Justices notes that, over time, the collection of “a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements reflects a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”3 Separately, Justice Sotomayor writes that tracking technology
provides “a substantial quantum of intimate information…that enables the
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, [a person’s] political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”4
As in Jones, practices aggregating isolated acts into knowledge has
typically focused on the impact on individuals. This Article inverts that focus.
Just as aggregating isolated pieces of public information provides tremendous
knowledge of individuals, it also provide tremendous knowledge as to the acts
Assistant Professor of Law, LSU Law Center; Associate, University of Texas
Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law; J.D., University of Chicago, 2001;
LL.M, European University Institute, 2002. The author is tremendously grateful for the
helpful comments provided during faculty colloquium engagements at George Mason
University School of Law, the University of Oregon School of Law, the University of
Arkansas School of Law, and Santa Clara University Law School.
1
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
2
The concept that monitoring of “public” acts was not subject to the Fourth
Amendment flows from United States v. Knotts. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
3
Jones, 132 S. Ct at 955 (Alito, concurring), citing People v. Weaver, 12 N. Y. 3d
433, 441-442, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2009); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), No. 10-1259.
∗
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Jones, 132 S. Ct at 925 (Sotomayor, concurring)
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and beliefs of governments, the very elements that govern the formation of
customary international law (CIL).
As it stands, the established mechanisms of international law
formation have stalled. A primary cause of this legal sluggishness is the
perceived illegitimacy of customary international law. The design of CIL,
emergent from the civil law tradition, was intended to enable a dynamic body
of legal norms untethered to text. Over time, both perceived and real
infirmities within the system’s understanding of customary law have left
customary law as a source of last resort.
“Networked custom” offers an alternative understanding of CIL
formation to reinvigorate the intended dynamism of CIL by tracking it to
distillations of society’s diverse and dispersed. While not embracing
particular methodologies, the Article also explains the necessary
characteristics and limiting principles in capturing networked intelligence.
Ultimately, with a theoretical framework in place, this piece explains how
applying networked custom can repair CIL’s legitimacy, restore its dynamism,
and positively influence the unfolding expansion of international legal
personality.
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INTRODUCTION
Customary international law (CIL), law said to form through
widespread state practice that hardens into a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris) is the binding agent of the international legal system. While treaties
create the structural form of international law, CIL norms operate to tighten
the inevitable breaches left within and between the express terms of written
law.
In many ways, CIL holds a privileged position in the international
legal system. Customary law is universal. While treaties require explicit and
affirmative approval, rules of customary law bind all states. Customary law is
cheap. Customary law flows directly from that which states are engaged, thus
resulting in minimal transaction costs. Treaties, on the other hand, if
successful at all, require endless negotiation, political maneuvers, redrafting,
compromises and meetings. Customary law is organically produced.
Customary practices become law while no one is watching. In contrast, the
process of treaty ratification is fraught with political peril and thus subject to
political assassination. Most importantly, customary law is dynamic. Once
ratified, the subject matter governed by treaties is subjugated to the
preeminence of text. Even the most creatively worded treaty language draws
boundaries in its operation and interpretation that constricts an adaptation to
changed circumstances.
Despite these advantages, CIL is under the heavy attack. Scholars have
respectively characterized customary law for being inefficient, illegitimate,
and ineffective.5 Recent literature argues that claims regarding the content of
CIL is divorced from empirical claims of state practice and vary broadly
dependent upon the entity asserting it.6 Failing to ground CIL content in
externally provable claims renders such norms perpetually vague, which, in
5

See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 449 (2000); Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 859, 889-94 (2006); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International
Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007).
6
Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 6 (2010).
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turn creates uncertainty, unpredictability, and diminished legitimacy.7 In
answering the assault, “most defenders of CIL have responded by simply
ignoring the critiques.”8
This Article does not seek to assuage critics as to the current state of
CIL, but rather persuade critics and advocates of customary law alike that a
revitalized, more legitimate and effective body of CIL is available through
identifying a comprehensive, authoritative and objective process of
identifying state practice and opinio juris utilizing networked technology.
Instead of scholarly or institutional edict, this proposal rests its case on recent
developments in communication theory and the epistemic advantages offered
through networked communications. The result is a truer, more dynamic, and
thus more effective body of customary law that proves capable of responding
to the fundamental challenges facing the current legal regime.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I briefly set out the
design impediments plaguing the efficient formation of international law and
the consequences that flow from those flaws. This part rejects the notion that
treaty proliferation can replace the value established through a functional body
of CIL. Part II turns its attention to creating legal legitimacy through adoption
of knowledge attained through networked aggregation. This Part first
considers the legitimacy challenges facing CIL and then, in detail, describes
and explains the value and animating features of collective intelligence and
how it can be applied to customary law. Regarding current conceptions, I
argue that both critics and proponents of CIL have failed to recognize that it’s
primary legitimacy failure is epistemic in nature. In short, the failure of a
robust knowledge of state practice and opinio juris, the inputs of CIL, such
law has been victimized by diverse initiatives to manipulate its outcomes
compromising its core legitimacy. Following this, I describe the animating
principles of networked knowledge and their advantages in knowing and
understanding the acts and beliefs of states. Finally, in Part III, I briefly set
out some of the fundamental impacts of networked knowledge beyond the
direct question of CIL formation.

7

Id.
Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010).
8
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW FORMATION AND RESPONSIVE LAW
On December 11, 2011, Christiana Figueres, the executive secretary
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, was
absolutely ecstatic. The reason for Figueres’ excitement was the agreement of
over 190 state parties to the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.”
Invoking Nelson Mandela, Figueres wrote to her Twitter followers “It always
seems impossible until it is done. And it is done!”9 She was not alone in her
excitement. Jo Leinen, the Chair of the EU Parliament delegation to the
conference declared, “The world has achieved a major breakthrough in the
fight against climate change.”10
Based upon the excitement expressed by Figueres and Leinen, you
would be forgiven for believing that the Durban Platform represented the
consummation of a global treaty with binding force. In fact, the two-page
agreement is much more modest, setting out a “road map” to guide states to
the goal of actually consummating a treaty by 2015 which will take legal
effect in 2020. In the interim, the vast majority of state parties will have held
election through which they may empower new heads of state, and, if the
work of multiple scientists proves true, the world have long-missed the
opportunity to head off the worse effects of climate change.11
If the excitement of diplomats such as Figueres and Leinen is
mystifying on the substance of the Durban Platform, it is much more
understandable in the world of international diplomacy where the formation of
new (and widely recognized) substantive international law, whether through
treaty or custom, has become extraordinarily difficult.

9

See Climate Change Summit: Global Deal Recovered After Marahton Talks in
Durban, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, December 12, 2011.
10
See UN Climate Summit: Talks succeed, action must follow, EUROPEAN UNION
NEWS, December 13, 2011.
11
See John M. Broder, U.S. Pushes to Cut Emissions of Some Pollutants That Hasten
Climate Change, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 16, 2012 (noting that by the time a treaty
would be in force “scientists say that irreversible dmage to the atmosphere will be done.”). In
fact, two months following the announcement of the Durban Platform a group of countries
announced unilateral measures due to their impatience with (and perhaps skepticism toward)
“the slow pace of international climate change” negotiations.
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A. Explicit and Implicit Legal Rules
CIL and treaty law are complementary and interdependent. The
increasing delegitimization of CIL and the tempting clarity of positivism have
thrown the balance of the international legal system off kilter, threatening the
viability of the robust system of norms that system has created. The inability
of CIL to deliver the pliability and general legal rules upon which the
substantive rule of law can attach and adapt, threatens the effectiveness of
treaty law as well. Treaties, always highly costly to complete, are even more
difficult to finalize because overarching general customary rules are not
present providing points of general legal consensus. When the cost of treaties
is too high to complete, the absence of CIL leaves the substantive area fallow.
When consummated, treaties are expected to exhibit flexibility in application
far beyond the anchor of their text, threatening the predictive clarity that is
their defining value. As this progression intensifies, the substantive character
of international law becomes increasingly locked in anachronism. .
1. The Limits of Treaty Formation and Alteration
Treaties form the core of modern international law.12 Over the past
several decades, there has been a natural progression of the international legal
system, both in scholarship and practice, toward treaties and away from
customary international law. The movement toward treaties is, in large part,
a response to the assault on custom.13 Yet, the preference for treaties has not
been accompanied by a corresponding increasing wave of treaty formation
especially in relationship to the most pressing international issues of the day.14

12

Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict of the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 73 (2000).
13
See David J. Bederman, National Security: Globalization, International Law and
United States Foreign Policy, 50 EMORY L.J. 717, 733-734 (2001).
14
While it is not uncommon to see references to the “proliferation of treaties”, such
authors are typically referring to the set of multi-lateral treaties emanating directly following
the conclusion of World War II. See e.g., John Murphy, Book Review: The Evolving
Dimensions of International Law: Hard Choices for the World Community, 104 AJIL 688,
690 (2010). This is not to say that there are not more treaties on highly particularlized
questions. See Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International Obligation of
State Organs, 29 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 45, 104 (2003). The existence of these types of
treaties, in fact, demonstrate where the strength of treaty law lies (precision) growing form
existing law, while their necessity proves the weakening of custom.
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The rise of treaties, partially driven by positivistic trends and the
written nature of treaties, emphasized treaties’ provision of greater specificity
regarding substantive regulations and areas of applicability.15 Treaties tend to
possess clearer substantive rules and formal and identifiable mechanisms to
gauge consent and breach.16 Broadly accepted multilateral treaties also assist
in the movement toward legal uniformity among multiple nations in various
circumstances.
The rise of treaties, especially in the immediate period following
World War II, has been instrumental to the dramatic substantive expansion of
international law. 17 During the thirty years following the conclusion of that
War the world saw the introduction of a several new treaties providing both an
expansion of substantive legal scope, but also a new degree of precision by
which states were bound by international law. In contrast, the past thirty years
has seen tremendous political, technological, and sociological changes without
anything approaching the post-WWII treaty crescendo. The obstacles to new
substantial treat law are essentially two-fold: prohibitively high costs
associated with treaty formation and inertial commitment to treaties already
made.

15

See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1999) (discussing the rise of
positivism in international law); see also Harlan Douglas J. Sylvester, Customary
International Law, Forcible Abductions, and America’s Return to the ‘Savage State’, 42
BUFFALO L. REV. 555, 608 (1994); John K. Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public
Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715, 736 (2005) (discussing advantages of explicit (written) law).
16
“Treaty law features iterations with relatively distinct temporal boundaries;
possesses clear, formal mechanisms for evaluating whether a nation has consented to certain
rules; and boasts a prospective, written format, specifying rules that can serve as touchstones
against which to assess the actual behavior of consenting nations.” Setear, supra note __, at
722.
17
Some literature explore the proposition that completed treaties reduce transaction
costs of state entities for subsequent activities. See Aceves, supra note __, at 1016-18. This is
undoubtedly true to varying extents based upon the area of law being regulated. See id. at
1060-64. The reduction in transaction costs for state activities relative to the area regulated is
relevant to this analysis only insofar as such benefits represent the path dependence discussed
earlier. See id. As such, the reduction of transaction costs in regulated areas (to the extent it
exists) only acts to raise the costs of states seeking to alter substantive norms of the governing
treaty. See id.
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Prohibitively high transaction, uncertainty, and opportunity costs make
treaty law formation difficult.18 Unfortunately, the treaty creation process is
extraordinary in the transaction costs required and uncertainty created. 19 At
the front end, potential treaty parties vary greatly in their international power,
history, underlying legal systems, languages, domestic politics, relevant
interest groups, and economic framework, all of which may effect the
negotiation, drafting, and agreement to a treaty.20 While the accumulation of
treaty partners expands the reach of the proposed treaty’s scope, it
simultaneously makes consensus on drafted language more difficult. At the
back end, once drafted, a state wishing to enter into the treaty has to undertake
the incorporation and execution of the new treaty’s provisions within their
own domestic system.21 In the United States, this means seeking a
supermajority vote of U.S. Senators to accomplish ratification.22 Following
18

See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of National Courts: Treaty Law and Legal
Transition Costs, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1303, 1308 (examining uncertainty costs of new
treaties due to “questions of meaning, scope, and effect”); Elizabeth Burleson and Diana Pei
Wu, Essay: Non-State Actor Access and Influence in International Legal and Policy
Negotiations, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV. 193, 206 (“High transaction costs can hinder
the formation of bilateral, regional, and global treaties.”); see generally Michael P. Van
Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002).
19
Some literature explore the proposition that completed treaties reduce transaction
costs of state entities for subsequent activities. See Aceves, supra note __, at 1016-18. This is
undoubtedly true to varying extents based upon the area of law being regulated. See id. at
1060-64. The reduction in transaction costs for state activities relative to the area regulated is
relevant to this analysis only insofar as such benefits represent the path dependence discussed
earlier. See id. As such, the reduction of transaction costs in regulated areas (to the extent it
exists) only acts to raise the costs of states seeking to alter substantive norms of the governing
treaty. See id.
20
“Transaction cost economics refines price theory by including consideration of, for
example, the cost of identifying potential transactors, negotiating agreement and enforcing
agreement. For a variety of reasons, including the number of interested parties, these
transaction costs are frequently high in the international context, and opportunities for joint
gain through contracting may therefore not be realized.” Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1999).
21
See Jacob M. Harper, Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race: The Legality
and Desirability of Bush’ National Space Policy Under the Public and Customary
International Laws of Space, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 681, 689 (2008) (noting that “perceptions that
the US is violating customary international law may themselves have negative foreign policy
consequences.”) This is especially true when many states may be uninterested in the
substantive contours of any given established rule. See id.
22
Or a simple majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives in the case
of a congressional-executive agreement.
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ratification, the state’s obligations must be made operable, usually through
both additional administrative and legislative action. Once successful on each
of these fronts, there remains substantial uncertainty as to the potential impact
of unintended consequences domestically and the execution of obligations by
fellow treaty partners internationally. These costs preclude agreements even
where multiple states possess aligned interests and recognize a clear benefit to
treaty formation.23
The impediments to new treaty formation apply with at least equal
force to treaty alteration. Changes to treaties in most legal systems will require
the exact same processes as those associated with entirely new international
agreements. 24 Further, collection action problems invoked by treaty alteration
are severe as states disinvested in the substantive regulation possess little
incentive to break ranks and states seeking treaty changes are likely already to
be viewed skeptically as law breakers of the existing regime.25 These
problems are exacerbated by the fact that the benefits associated with treaty
alteration are likely to be lower at a rate corresponding to the variance in the
amount of change sought.
2. The Power of Custom
CIL, an equal partner with treaty law, represents those norms rendered
binding through the existence of state practice followed by a sense of legal
obligation.26 Such law binds all states, regardless of explicit consent.27 As

23

“Transaction cost economics refines price theory by including consideration of, for
example, the cost of identifying potential transactors, negotiating agreement and enforcing
agreement. For a variety of reasons, including the number of interested parties, these
transaction costs are frequently high in the international context, and opportunities for joint
gain through contracting may therefore not be realized.” Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1999).
24
See Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International law: A Response
to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 164-65 (2001).
25
Setear, supra note __, at 721-22.
26
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38; CASSESE, supra
note __, at 156; A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1971).
27
See e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶186 (June 27); Asylum Case (Colom. V. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 274 ¶ 277-8
(Nov. 20); Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, ¶131 (Dec. 18).
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such, the recognition of such norms offers a universally binding alternative to
expensive treaty process.28
No contemporary legal system is entirely reliant on explicit law
instruments like legislation or treaties. The Anglo-American common law
system defines itself by the power of judicial precedent as a source of binding
law. While repudiating binding precedent, civil law systems favor custom as
an independent source of law. In practice, both civil and common law
systems have found it wise to borrow from the unwritten source of law of the
other. 29 Civilian legal systems are finding increasingly unified judicial
decisions based, in part, on past precedent.30 Common law systems
incorporate custom as context by which the interpretation of law is
influenced.31 Both practices serve the indispensable purpose of making law
more functional by safeguarding reliance of societal practices while providing
legal rules with the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.32 Expunging
28

As noted by William Aceves, the transaction cost obstacle to treaty formation may
lead states to prefer customary law to treaties in order to avoid expensive negotiation,
agreement, and maintenance costs. Aceves, supra note __, at 1066. “If the transaction costs
associated with the negotiation of treaty law are high, states may prefer customary
international law because it allows states to forego expensive and time-consuming
negotiations. Likewise, if the transaction costs associated with the codification of treaty law
are high, states may also prefer customary international law because it does not require a
formal agreement. Finally, if the transaction costs associated with the maintenance of treaty
law are high, states may prefer customary international law because it functions even in the
absence of a formal structure.” Id.
29
See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law:
Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 73
(2001) (“The common-law recognition of precedents as a binding source of law is blending
with the civil-law custom of norm-formation for general prospective deductive application.”).
30
See e.g., Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law
(Part One of a Trilogy), 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 913 (noting that civil law case law is
not “the binding rule of stare decisis in Anglo-Saxon law, but in many instances, it is a ‘nearly
mandatory' rule of stare decisis.”); see also Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of
Nation-Building: An Introduction, 60 ME. L. REV. 281, 296 (2008).
31
See Aniceto Masferrer, Defense of the Common Law Against Postbellum American
Codification: Reasonable and Fallacious Argumentation, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, (2010)
(“The Common Law is the mass of the undigested customs, not reduced to system…”).
32
See Elizabeth B. Wydra, Constitutional Problems with Judicial Takings Doctrine
and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 109, 121 (2011) (common law); Christophe Jamin, Saleilles’ and Lambert’s Old
Dream Revisited, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 707-710 (2002) (civil law); see generally LEO
GROSS & RICHARD W. NELSON, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (4th
ed. 1982).
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precedent or custom respectively would collapse the basic architecture of both
systems. The convergence of common law precedent and civilian custom only
reinforces the crucial nature of each version of implicit law. 33
CIL plays a similarly crucial role in the international legal system.
The crippling of CIL has not been accompanied by a correlating rise in a
different, analogous contender.34 The international legal system, formed with
the precepts of the civil law system at its core and lacking the judicial
instruments required of an effective common law jurisprudence, embraced
custom out of necessity.35
The “simultaneously stable and provisional” character of custom is
also of particular value within the distinct attributes of international law.36
Scholars of international relations have long known that states are influenced
tremendously by state interest. The stability and universal binding power of
CIL encourages coordination around existing norms while avoiding locking
the law into an eternal doctrinal stance.37
The current position of CIL belies its stable, but pliable branding.
Critics rightfully note that our current conceptions of CIL formation, however,
33

David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign
Policy, 50 EMORY L. J. 717, 734-35 (2001).
34
Notably, despite substantial scholarship criticizing or promoting CIL, the question
of an alternative, other than additional treaty reliance, never appears to be addressed.
35
See Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law
Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1105 (“from its earliest stage, international
law developed among civil law ideas, with the predictable result that it reflected those very
ideas.”).
36
Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the
Common Law, 76 DENV. U.L. REV. 961, 967 (“the relevant aspects of customary law are its
simultaneously stable and provisional or tentative character--common law rules can be 'in
play' long after they are settled--and the fact that there is implied in practices or customs a
kind of "emergent consensus" about a particular kind of controversy.”).
37
A common criticism of customary law is that the path to change often (not always)
requires transgressing the law. In a way, this is similarly true within the common law. In
common law, judges only receive the opportunity to opine on the content of law where the
unlawfulness of action is in question. In any event, the critique is only a streng one if the
aforementioned violations usurp the underlying stability of the legal system more than usual.
This is far from obvious. There is little reason to believe that judicial actors distinguishing,
surreptitiously overruling, or overtly overruling prior precedent are any less disruptive than
customary change. See Benito Arrunada & Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as
Pro-Market Adaptations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 118-119 (2008) (asserting the
equivalency of common law and civil law in stability and efficiency).
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have failed to produce on the genre’s promise of “flexibility” and
“suppleness”.38 The opaqueness of state practice and psychological
dependency of opinio juris has resulted in the sourcing of the raw materials of
CIL, state practice and opinio juris are fraught with controversy.39 The fact
that there is little agreement as to how to identify when CIL norms form or the
substantive boundaries of such norms means that asserting any rule that strays
from the textbook example is questioned.40
CIL has been branded as the “weak” side of international law that is
typically unenforceable and has jeopardized the viability of the international
legal system as a whole.41 Specifically, commentators assert that CIL is
unworkably ambiguous, manipulable, undemocratic, divorced from actual
practice and state consent, and hortatory in character.42 While the precise
contour of each critique is unique, the unifying theme of CIL skeptics is that
the lack of empirical knowledge has led to normative creativity. Because
ascertaining an objectively provable “truth” to state practice and opinio juris
has proven elusive, scholars have reacted by an objective body of law in favor
of their own normative judgments.
B. Usurping CIL Creates Anachronistic and Unresponsive Law
38

LEO GROSS & RICHARD W. NELSON, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (4th ed. 1982).
39
Id. at 57.
40
David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign
Policy, 50 EMORY L. J. 717, 734-35 (2001).
41
See Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359, 360 (1988)
(comparing to treaties); Leslie Deak, Customary International Labor Laws and Their
Application in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 44
(noting many feel “customary international law appears to be a vague unenforceable theory
with no base upon which to stand”); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 529 (2000) (stating that “CIL has engendered controversy,
dimished respect for the [ICJ], and is ultimately unenforceable.”).
42
See generally Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current
Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 327-30
(1997); John K. Setear, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 715, 719
(2005); Kelly, supra note __ at 450-458; Janis, supra note __ at 362-64. I will not be directly
addressing the assertion that CIL, independent of the flaws noted above, does not affect state
behavior. See e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). To the extent such critiques are not reflective of the
legitimacy flaws discussed herein, they will tend to be correct (or incorrect) regarding
international law as a whole rather than CIL specific.
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The perceived illegitimacy of CIL incurs tremendous harm. Legal
systems require flexibility to operate efficiently. The continuing divestment
of CIL’s role as a pliable substrate of international law is causing an
increasingly anachronistic and unresponsive body of law.43 To date, the
response to the weakening of CIL has been greater reliance on treaties.44 Due
to the high costs associated with treaty-making and treaty alteration this treaty
reliance manifests itself in reading existing treaties more broadly, insisting on
their unwavering adaptation to changing circumstances and attempting to
transform their reach from those party to the agreement to the entire globe.45
Ironically, the further treaties are stretched the more they are susceptible to
their sparking their own delegitimation. In the meantime, the more substance
they are asked to cover, the more they become entrenched, further promoting
anachronistic rules.46
Given the criticism of CIL and its increasingly fragile hold on
legitimacy, one might believe that the destruction of CIL as a binding source
of law would actually benefit the international legal system.47 In this view,
the persistence of a weakened body of CIL acts to further obstruct treaty
formation. Once definitively removed from the regime design of international
law, states will not be tempted to rest on weak claims of custom and know
that, should they desire new law, an explicit agreement establishing such law
must be made. Thus, the adaptation to an exclusively explicit agreement
based legal system will encourage the creation of new law while strengthening

43

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note __ at 333.
Id.
45
Id. at 340.
46
William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International law: Transaction Cost
Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1061-63
(1996). See generally Kaushik Basu et al., The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of the
New Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 1
passim (1987); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 passim (1995).
47
See Theodore Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 348 passim (1987) (discussing interpretive and law changing defenses of states in the
law of war). Given the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms, the framing effects of this
analytic move are substantial. See id. Instead of being forced to change behavior or provide
plausible interpretation of its
44
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the force of such law that accompanies the clarity of legal obligation treaties
provide.48
In fact, there is little reason to believe that either would occur. This
analysis is dependent upon the idea that, absent the ability to rely on CIL,
states will possess increased interest in new treaty provisions. Even if true,
there is little, if any, reason to believe that the costs associated with treaty
formation would decrease. More likely, the continuing inability to easily and
efficiently create new legal instruments or norms would accelerate the current
trend of excessive dependence on existing treaty regimes.49 As demonstrated
in correlation with the weakening of CIL, this reliance leads to stagnation of
legal norms.50 Treaty reliance creates a path dependency in state action and
promulgates a flow of inapposite or non-operative legal rules.51 Ironically,
with the passage of time, these inertial forces imbue longstanding treaties with
a sacred aura of immutability.
The immutability of treaties would be a minor concern if CIL was
better positioned to fulfill its traditional role as a legitimate route for filling
the gaps within and between treaty law. In such circumstances, legal
provisions that might be considered anachronistic in isolation are enlivened
through unwritten augmentation.
The Constitution of the United States provides an example of staid text
operating alongside dynamic law.52 The text of the Constitution, while
48

See id. at 359.
Some have asserted that such changes required even longer than decades. See Paul
R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
455, 465 (2010) (“Raditionally a new norm acquired the status of customary international law
only after two requirements had been satisfied, consistent state practice and opinio juris.
Customary international law thus changed slowly, often over the course of a century or
more.”).
50
Id. at 468.
51
See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, October Term 2001 Foreword: Five to
Four, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 177 (2002); Shickler, supra note __, at 763; Laurence H. Tribe,
Lost at the Equal Protection Carnival: Nelson Lund’s Carnival of Mirrors, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 619 (2002).
52
See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITTUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT 164-65 (Oxford
University Press 2006); Robert A. Ferguson, “We Do Ordain And Establish”: The Constittion
as Literary Text, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 3; Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for
States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1808-09
49
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written broadly and contemplated generally, is unmistakably a product of its
time. Despite its reputation as the emblem of freedom and democracy, the
U.S. Constitution embeds some remarkably contradictory precepts (enshrining
freedom while institutionalizing slavery) alongside decidedly anti-democratic
processes of republican government. 53 Despite these inadequacies, its
overarching validity has endured. While the energy behind its longevity is
multi-fold, part of its continuing relevance comes through its continuous
refinement through the common law practice of judicial precedent. 54 The
practice of repeated formal legal process interpreting the document’s text that
provides lasting resolution to contemporary problems means that the “law”
represented by the document extends far beyond the boundaries set out within
its text.55
International law lacks a judicial body with the authority and repeated
opportunity of the U.S. Supreme Court to refine legal principles. True to the
tradition of the civil law system, custom is the source of unwritten law favored
within the international legal system.56
The sanctification of the law is a by-product of age, tradition, purpose,
and path dependency. As legal instruments age, the substantive rules they
encompass are no longer questioned.57 Instead, their dictates are incorporated
(2009); Michael Les Benedict, Our ‘Sacred’ Constitution – Another View of the Constitution
as Literary Text, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 27, 31-32 (1987).
53
See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 32-44; Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court,
October Term 2000 Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 111-12 (2001). It is also
worth noting that the evidence also indicates the general public holds a view of constitutional
interpretation. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1813-15 & 1834 n.145.
54
See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 43.
55
It should be noted that common law practices and judicial refinement would not be
sufficient to rescue the U.S. Constitution from some of the anachronisms deeply embedded
within it. This reality is precisely why the country has periodically traversed through the
difficult amendment process, generally with tremendous success.
56
See Trimble, supra note __ at 255.
57
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 96-99 (1990). See John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, Constitutions as
Ideology, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 525, 526 (1980); Harold Jonhju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture:
Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 651-53 (1998); Richard
Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution: An Address Given to the Annual Convention of the
National Lawyers Guild, July 6, 1968, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125, 129 (1968-1969); Howard
Zinn & Laura Stewart, Ideology in the Courtroom, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 714 (19851986).
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into the background of societal life, part of the set upon which life unfolds.58
The longer such rules are incorporated in the society’s practices, they become
cultural touchstones incorporated into the society’s tradition of law.59 As the
legal rules of a treaty fade into the background, the norms established by a
treaty become incorporated in subsequent decisions of both individual nationstates as well as the international community at large.60 The interconnected
nature of these rules means that substantive changes to the foundational treaty
cause a domino effect among other international and national legal rules made
in reliance of the original instrument – a phenomenon more generally called
path dependency.61
Even irrational or obviously anachronistic Constitutional provisions
can soundly defeat deeply held societal principles. Prior to the 2000
presidential election, nearly all American citizens would have told you that a
crucial component of the “democratic” nature of the nation was fundamentally
tied to the fact that the state engaged in free and fair elections in which the
“will of the people” was followed by placing candidate with the greatest
number of votes in office.62 In that year, however, the recipient of the greatest
number of votes in the presidential competition, Al Gore, did not win the
election.63 Instead, George W. Bush was became the American president due
to an electoral college system designed for the 18th century.64 While Gore’s
supporters were embittered, few insisted that a Constitutional amendment was
58

Koh, supra note __, at 628-29; Harold Hongj Koh, Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Legal Process].
59
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2003); Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra
note __, at 201-03.
60
Harold Jonhju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2657-58 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?]. See Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, supra note __, at 204.
61
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note __, at 2654-55. See
generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 passim (2001); S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205
passim (1995).
62
See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 48-49; Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court,
October Term 2000 Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111-12 (2001); Laurence
Tribe, Bush v. Gore and its Disguises, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 290 (2001).
63
See e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103-04 (2000).
64
Erick Schickler, Terri Bimes & Robert W. Mickey, Safe at Any Speed: Legislative
Intent, The Electoral Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL. 717, 731 (2000).
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in order.65 Instead, the public re-oriented its definition of democracy to
remain consistent with the Constitution’s text.66
The 2000 election is only one example of how Constitutional
sanctification has undermined contemporary preferences thus effectuating an
objectively absurd, or at least normatively undesirable, result.
The
Constitution’s inaugural delay for newly elected Presidents reflects the
technical limitations of the 18th century and has no rational justification in
contemporary America.67 Enabling a new president to be inaugurated
immediately after his victory is certified, would avoid the self-serving, and
potentially dangerous, unaccountable lame duck acts of an outgoing leader.68
The characteristics of legal sanctification apparent in the U.S.
Constitution have similarly resulted in the consecration of the cornerstone
substantive treaties of modern international law. Just as in the Constitutional
example, the immutability of such instruments creates anachronisms through
the substantive law such treaties represent. The anachronism problem of
sanctification in the treaty context, however is both qualitatively and
quantitatively more severe than those that arise in the domestic context for
two reasons. First, the international community does not possess a legal
interpretation regime comparable to the U.S. federal judiciary that possesses
both the opportunity and legitimacy to engage in flexible interpretation of
treaty obligations to negate the effect of anachronistic tendencies present in
the law. Second, the number of treaties, impossibility of amendment, and the
high transaction costs required to create new treaty instruments means that the
gross volume of such anachronisms is substantially higher than those
manifested in domestic systems.

65

RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 189 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May
Mean More than “Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v.
Gore, 35 HASINTGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 601, 629-30 (2007-2008).
66
See LEVINSON, supra note __, at 165.
67
See Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, October Term 2001 Foreword: Five to
Four, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 177 (2002); Shickler, supra note __, at 763; Laurence H. Tribe,
Lost at the Equal Protection Carnival: Nelson Lund’s Carnival of Mirrors, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 619 (2002).
68
David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign
Policy, 50 EMORY L. J. 717, 734-35 (2001).
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C. Reinvigorating Custom
The systemic character of anachronism within international law
requires a systemic response. A different of conceptualization of how
customary international law is formed remains the greatest chance for a
responsive body of law. The transaction costs of treaty consummation can be
ameliorated, but cannot be eliminated. In contrast, the ambiguity, structural
disarray, and illusory tie to state consent surrounding customary law invites
reinvention. The roots of this reinvention lie in a reexamination of the
justification of transforming practice into law outside the international
context.
II. KNOWING CUSTOM THROUGH NETWORKS
In 2005, a New York doctor, Robert Greenwald, wrote a letter to the
editor of The New England Journal of Medicine describing an incident where
physicians and a medical fellow were presented with an infant suffering from
diarrhea, an unusual rash, immune system failure and a variety of other
symptoms.69
The attending physicians and house staff discussed several diagnostic
possibilities, but no consensus was reached. Finally, the visiting professor
asked the fellow if she had made a diagnosis, and she reported that she had
indeed and mentioned a rare syndrome known as IPEX…. It appeared to fit
the case, and everyone seemed satisfied. (Several weeks later, genetic testing
on the baby…confirm[ed] the diagnosis.)
“How did you make that diagnosis?” asked the professor. Came the reply,
“Well…I entered the salient features into Google, and it popped right up.”70
The physician reporting the story was dismayed. “Are we physicians
no longer needed? Is an observer who can accurately select the findings to be
entered in a Google search all we need for a diagnosis to appear, as if by
magic? […] Even worse, the Google diagnostician might be linked to an

69

Dr. Robert Greenwald, “And a diagnostic test was performed,” 359 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 2089, 2090 (2005).
70
Id.
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evidence-based medicine database, so a computer could e-mail the
prescription to the e-druggist with no human involvement needed.”71
The doctor’s reaction is driven by his training and society’s changing
relationship with its caregivers. His medical education taught him a
diagnostic methodology. That methodology was reinforced over multiple
years of practice. Understandably, new intrusions that deviate from or
(worse) question the validity of his understood methodology are viewed with
suspicion.72
Externally, society’s view of doctors has also changed
dramatically. For much of history doctors were seen as the nearly exclusive
purveyors of medical information. Patients, accepting that they lacked access
to the knowledge held by the doctor, responded by adopting a highly
deferential posture relative to a doctor’s conclusions. Over the past twenty
years, empowered by the availability of medical information on the internet,
patients have taken an increasingly assertive role. More than 65% of patients
research their health condition before a doctor’s visit (assessing whether one
is necessary) or after the doctor’s visit (assessing the correctness of the
doctor’s diagnosis).73
Proponents of our current conception of CIL formation are much like
the befuddled Dr. Greenwald. Over the past century, the methodology of CIL
formation has only tangentially depended upon empirical proof. While it was
expected that CIL rules would possess some empirical underpinning, the focus
had shifted to normative argument. Recently however, the divergence of
actual practice and asserted norms has become acutely noticeable,
compromising the empirical touchstone that undergirds the entire system.
Attempts to rehabilitate CIL possess value, but ultimately, CIL cannot
be saved until its advocates are able to offer a way to recreate trust in the
law’s basic justifications for legitimacy: it’s accuracy, consistency and
71

Id.
According to one study, older doctors are likely to feel threatened and “respond
defensively” to patients offering information gleaned from the internet while younger doctors
view the patients’ research as an opportunity for collaboration. See Miriam McMullan,
Patients using the Internet to obtain health information: How this affects the patient-health
professional relationship, 63 PATIENT EDU. & COUNS. 24, 25-28 (2006).
73
See Suzy A. Iverson, Kristin B. Howard, Brian K. Penney, Impact of Internet Use
on Health Related Behaviors and the Patient-Physician Relationship: A Survey-Based Study
and Review, 108 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASSOC. 699-711 (2008).
72
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empirical observability. Fortunately, the forces of information thus far used to
cripple CIL can be harnessed to revitalize it in this very way.
A. Legitimacy and Sourcing Law
The legitimacy and authority of CIL, like all bodies of law, is
dependent upon coherent regime design.74 Rule creation regimes need to
fulfill basic fundamental values – accuracy, fairness and efficiency – to
achieve systemic legitimacy, and in turn, enhance authority.75 Accurate rules
reflect provable inferences from relevant events. Rules created understandably
with participatory opportunities and absent undue influence are generally
considered fair. Finally, efficient rulemaking exists when rules reflecting the
other basic values can be made with relatively low costs.76 Fair rules rules
Some legitimacy derives from possessing observable procedures of
lawmaking that enable participation of those affected and produce rules with
substantial clarity with authority exercised accordingly.
In contrast, modern CIL formation methodology is opaque and
manipulable.77 The normative emphasis has created “unbridled proliferation
of contradictory norms” that creates uncertainty and encourages states to
engage in self-serving and opportunistic rule selection and interpretation.78
These inconsistencies and manipulations are exacerbated by the fact that,

74

This paper ascribes to the “regime” definition set out by Stephen Krasner as “sets
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge.” STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CAUSES AND REGIME
CONSEQUENCES: REGIMES AS INTERVENING VARIABLES (1982). Regime design questions are
fundamentally empirical in nature. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004) (“regime
design questions are essentially empirical in nature.”); Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and
International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767,
774-75 (2008); Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of International Law, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2004).
75
See generally Kaushik Basu et al., The Growth and Decay of Custom: The Role of
the New Institutional Economics in Economic History, 24 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 1
passim (1987).
76
“Costs” here meaning all types of costs (e.g. financial, opportunity, transaction,
etc).
77
See Trimble, supra note __.
78
Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1805.
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increasingly CIL rules appear entirely divorced from practice in the real
world.79
Treaties are legitimized by explicit consent. As such, treaty law binds
only those parties shown to have manifested explicit consent through the
repeated acts that precede (i.e. negotiation, drafting, signing, and ratification)
and post-date (e.g. invocation, acts of legal implementation) the
consummation of the treaty in question. These acts are further solidified by
the fact that state’s unhappy with their treaty obligations have the opportunity
to exit the treaty regime they don’t like. Cumulatively, these expressions of
consent insulate treaties from state’s that might assert that assertions that a
treaty provision should not apply due to its normative undesirability or special
circumstances.80
Because CIL is universally binding and precludes exit, it cannot
legitimize itself through consent.81 Customary law is empirical law.82 The
values associated with empiricism, objectivity and democracy, bestow
customary law (international and domestic) with its legitimacy.83 The
doctrine governing the creation of binding customary law turns on the
fulfillment of a claim about both the existence of a consistent state practice as
well as what motivates that state practice.84 CIL can only assert its authority
79

See Roberts, supra note __ at 770.
This isn’t to say that states don’t have a variety of available interpretive measures
to attempt to minimize the scope of treaty law or otherwise blunt its impact. Despite these,
arguments that the treaty is simply not binding on the state are rarely made because of the
expressions of consent (reinforced by exit mechanisms) that characterize that body of law.
81
See Bradley & ___, supra note __ at 377; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note __ at
225. Some argue that a state acquiesence to customary norms is appropriately viewed as
expressing consent that legitimates the binding nature of CIL rules. Even if true, that
legitimating authority is far less probative than the multiple affirmative actions taken by states
proactively engaged in by states in consummating treaty law. See Harlan Grant Cohen,
Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 78
(2007) ("Treaties, having been negotiated, written, signed, and ratified, present the strongest
evidence of consent.").
82
Kelly, supra note __ at 399 (“Customary norms are binding because they are, in
fact, accepted by all normal members of a society and are observable. Empirical acceptance is
the touchstone.”).
83
Id.
84
BROWNLIE, supra note __, at 6-7; CASSESE, supra note __, at 156-57; HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
368-93 (1958).
80
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insofar as the empirics fulfillment of the doctrine in question are observable.
From their inception, customary law of both the domestic and international
varieties have rested upon the belief that, once identified, the customary
practice of states exhibit a pattern of behavior that can be considered “best
practices” and, once bound in law, can capture efficiencies by encouraging
justifiable reliance.85 The jurisprudential roots of customary law reflect the
belief that customs reflect collective wisdom and tend toward normatively
attractive ends.86 The Romans considered custom as integrating the “general
habits” of the Roman people as a matter of law and as an equal to other bodies
of all applicable in the empire.87 To Burkeans, customary law embodies the
distillation of practices integrating the collective insight and wisdom of
society’s members.88 Those assertions however, by definition, hold no value
if the “customary practice” in fact does not represent actual practice.
Much of the perceived illegitimacy of CIL flows from two hallmarks
of modern CIL: (1) the law’s reliance on experts in identifying and presenting
the evidence of practice and opinio juris; and (2) the contemporary tendency
to approach CIL rules as fundamentally normative rather than epistemic
questions.
These two trends separate the basic justification of CIL, the
desirability of recognizing and coordinating existing practice, and fail to
provide a broadly applicable justification untainted by unmistakable policy
preferences and goals.
1. CIL’s Shift From Empirical to Normative Based Legitimacy
Theories of CIL formation can be roughly split into “traditional” and
“modern” methodologies. The traditional formulation emphasizes the
delineation of state practice as the cornerstone of CIL, while the modern

85
86

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (7th ed.
2008); D’AMATO, supra note __, at 52, 68, 82-84
87
See BEDERMAN, supra note __ at 19.
88
John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008).
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methodology emphasizes opinio juris. These two methodologies are united,
however, in their reliance on experts as the progenitors of CIL norms.89
The U.S. Supreme Court case decision in The Paquete Habana90 is
largely considered “a ‘model’ of how CIL becomes established” and a model
of “traditional” CIL formation methodology.91 It is also emblematic of
problems posed in relying upon experts in identifying the necessary
components of CIL. In The Paquette Habana, the Supreme Court was asked
to identify whether there was a customary international law rule prohibiting
the seizure of civilian fishing vessels during time of war. In answering the
question in the affirmative, Justice Gray relies on two veins of evidence of
state practice: specific past examples and and “the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”92
With these “[t]ext-writers of authority…it may be affirmed that they are
generally impartial in their judgment.”93
Mining the work of such experts, the Court affirms the customary rule
with a mixture of invoking specific past incidents and historical and
contemporary scholarly commentary. At first blush, the temporal breadth of
the Court’s research is impressive. The evidence Justice Gray cites in support
of the rule begins in 1403 with an order from Henry IV of England issuing an
order to his naval officers informing them of a treaty between England and
France enabling the citizen vessels flying under both states’ flags to be
excluded from capture.94 The Court continues, citing several other historical
examples, including a 1521 treaty between England and France, French and
Dutch edicts in 1536, an agreement between Franch and Holland in the latter

89

The relative weight among experts is a bit different between methodologies.
Traditional methodology is more judge driven while modern methodological processes is
more scholarly and NGO driven.
90
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
91
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between
Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 642 (2000).
92
Paquette Habana at 700.
93
Id. at 700-701.
94
Id. at 703.
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half of the 17th century, French and British orders and an agreement between
the U.S. and Prussia in the latter half of the 18th century.95
Paquette Habana is instructive in understanding the limitations of
traditional methodologies in the sourcing CIL formation through the first
reciting particular incidents and the invocation of multiple scholars in
establishing the transformation of the practice into binding law.
The scope of vision of individuals and groups of experts is inherently
limited and prone to bias. It is limited in both direct and indirect ways. It is
limited in a direct manner because the individuals engaged in the search are
limited not only by the information of which they can gain access, but also
their ability to process that information into usable form.96 It is indirectly
limited because of its inference of first-hand information from second-hand
sources. Justice Gray is using a second-hand source report of French practices
in vessel seizures and presenting it, much like hearsay, for the truth of the
matter asserted, i.e. that the French viewed the seizure of fishing vessels as
unlawful.
As work in social science has established, individuals tend to seek out
information that confirms preexisting views.97 Further, when evidence
contrary to one’s predilections is uncovered it is highly likely to be ignored or
distinguished.98 Homopholic tendencies mean that selection bias issues are
even more problematic within groups of individuals than they are in
individuals.
The opinion in Paquette Habana invokes both concerns. While the
breadth of time covered by the Court is significant, extended periods of time
are not discussed and when contrary practice is manifest, it is discarded as
proof of the rule “in the breach.”99 The historical examples cited seem
strikingly convenient for a determination that a prohibition against the seizure
95

Id. at 707-709.
In the “process” context I am referring to the physical limitations of human
interaction with information. There are only so many treatises Justice Gray could read (or
have his clerks read), understand, and set out due to limitations of time and the requirements
of humanity (again, both his own and his clerks’).
97
See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note __, at 2654-55.
98
See Sunstein, Republic 2.0, supra note __ at 114-120.
99
Id. at 92.
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of fishing vessels existed in law. The incidents the Court describes tend to
occur during time with only limited hostilities between states and often
represent circumstances in which the seizure of such vessels would have been
avoided due to limited naval resources or other instrumental concerns aligned
with the state’s own self-interest.100 Moreover, the Court magnifies isolated
incidents supportive of the rule it concludes existed and ignores or discounts
numerous other examples contradicting the existence of the rule.101 Similarly,
the contribution of the scholars cited in the Court’s opinion was not through
the provision of additional state practice – most used the same examples as the
Court – but in their conclusion of the meaning of that practice.102 In other
words, instead of utilizing scholarly work demonstrating vast state practice or
overwhelming opinio juris, the Court used evidence that scholars believed that
a CIL rule existed as proxy evidence that the doctrinal test had, in fact, been
fulfilled.103
The deceptively simple doctrine of CIL makes anything approaching
an objective and comprehensive treatment of state practice and opinio juris
impossible. As discussed above, ambiguity is pervasive within the current
methodologies of identifying established customary rules. Within the state
practice factor there is little agreement as to what type of state practice is
relevant and the relevant weight of varying practices. 104 Nor is there
agreement on the quantitative threshold of how much, how consistent and by
how many state acts are necessary to constitute sufficient practice.105 The
100

Goldsmith & Posner, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. at 648-650.
Id.
102
Id. at 649.
103
Notably, while all the scholars cited agreed with historical examples present in the
opinion, they diverged as to the existence of a CIL norm emanating from such practice. See
id. at 650.
104
See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 76-77 (1933). UN General Resolutions are sometimes counted despite their
nonbinding nature. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1169 (1999). The absence of certain practices
sometimes matter despite the questionable nature of their relevancy. See id. at 1134. Treaty
provisions, both bilateral and multilateral, are sometimes counted, often inconsistently as are
the writings of scholars and jurists despite deep intractable contradictions among them. See
id. at 1117. See also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 115, 125 (2005) (“There is no agreement on the forms of evidence that may be used to
demonstrate state practice.”).
105
Guzman, supra note __, at 125.
101
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“subjective” nature of opinio juris makes proof of its fulfillment similarly
difficult.106 Each of these evidentiary difficulties are compounded when one
seeks to find identifiable boundaries to the underlying norms and principles
being explored.
Recognizing the empirical difficulties, contemporary theorists have
foresworn attempting an objective and comprehensive empirical approach in
favor of a “modern” approach that emphasizes opinio juris.107 Unlike the
“traditional” CIL methodologies which, like Justice Gray in Paquette Habana,
emphasize state practice, the “modern” approach reflects a “deductive
process” reliant on “statements rather than actions” that proponents assert fits
more comfortably with the rights oriented nature of contemporary
international law.108 A natural result of modern CIL formulation is the
transference of treaty rules into CIL norms. Because modern CIL formulation
emphasizes opinio juris, it looks to assess the requisite “sense of legal
obligation” that accrues through other instruments of law such as treaties. As
the number of state parties to any treaty regime grows, one can say that more
states view themselves bound by the rules set out in the treaty in question.
One could also deduce that those states are, in practice, following the rule set
out in the treaty thus fulfilling the state practice prong of CIL formation
through the assumption that states carry out their legal obligation in practice.
When proposed CIL norms cannot be grounded directly in treaty law,
modern CIL looks to the domestic law of the state or statements by leaders
within the state regarding their position on the norm. Domestic regulations
regarding employment and labor standards can be used in creating
106

If not more so. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
8-9 (7th ed. 2008); D’AMATO, supra note __, at 52, 68, 82-84; BRIAN D. LEPARD,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 20-22
(2010); H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 47 (1972);
Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, 44
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 502-08 (1995).
107
H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 380 (1958) (emphasizing state practice); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts,
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95
AM. J. INT'L. L. 757, 758 (2001) (emphasizing opinio juris).
108
Other scholars have tweaked the “modern” approach. Andrew Guzman has
suggested an approach to opinio juris that emphasizes the “sense of legal obligation” of thirdparty states rather than the actor in question, a move that resolves a fundamental circularity
paradox often levied at CIL formation. Guzman, supra note __, at 123.
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international labor standards. Presidential statements chastising a foreign state
for alleged acts of detainee abuse can be used similarly.
Put simply, the modern approach resolves the sourcing problem by
altering what needs to be sourced. Instead of cataloging actual practice,
modern CIL catalogs the commitments made by the state through binding and
non-binding international agreements, domestic law instruments and, as a last
resort, public statements of high-level officials.109
The “modern” approach has meaningful advantages110 relative to its
“traditional” analog and appears to reflect a conception of customary
international law consistent with how it is perceived by international
institutions.111 The emphasis on opinio juris is superior to traditional CIL
formation in creating a framework of more comprehensiveness by cataloging
existing treaty obligations and public statements.
The perceived illegitimacy of modern CIL, however, indicates that its
new focus may invite more problems than it solves. While it easier to source
treaties and statements, the cataloging of such evidence is only as strong as it
is indicative that such sources serve as correct indicia of the “sense of legal
obligation” that opinio juris requires. Evidence indicates that discerning the
“psychological” element of customary international law is no easier than the
quandaries faced by the state practice orientation of traditional customary
international law. Worse, institutions like the International Law Commission,
a UN entity comprised of experts in the field of international law and charged
with the codification and development of CIL are perceived as engaged in
adopting legal rules that (consistent with moder CIL) are reside exclusively in
109

LEO GROSS & RICHARD W. NELSON, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (4th ed. 1982).
110
For one, it subverts the problem of discerning state practices (often unclear in
ideal circumstances and willfully obscured when considered unlawful) in favor of elevating
the state’s public (presumably more friendly) persona. Thus, it challenges states to be their
best selves. Also, the opinio juris emphasis at least implies a nimbler CIL formation
structure, one that responds in like speed as the heads of state of various nations respond to
emerging issues.
111
This appears especially true in the context of human rights where “the
identification of CIL consent has become so hard to square with the facts that courts and
scholars have dropped any pretense that CIL is grounded in actual state practice.” Goldsmith
& Levinson, supra note __, at 1848.
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the normative realm. Specifically, as stated by David Bederman, the “key
defect of modern custom is that in lauding ideal standards of state conduct, it
has become detached from actual state practice.”112
Perhaps most disconcerting is that, in the words of one commentator,
modern CIL introduces a circularity to the doctrine of CIL formation where
“opinio juris is necessary for there to be a rule of law, and a rule of law is
necessary for there to be opinio juris.”113
2. The Failure of Consent
The binding nature of international legal rules, both treaty and custom,
is said to flow from state consent, regardless of the source of the obligation in
question. 114 The consent doctrine “gives international law its validity” and
legitimizes the expectation of the international community that legal
obligations will be followed.115 While explicit consent is expected within
treaty law, customary international law has long relied upon an assertion of
implied consent.116 The implied consent notion asserts that states failing to
object during the formation of customary international law norms have
consented to those norms as binding rules.117
The implied consent doctrine is a fiction. Given the ambiguity and
uncertainty of norms and practices, especially before they are established as
law, it is more likely that most states did not even contemplate the norm,
112

DAVID BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 145 (2010).
Guzman, supra note __, at 123.
114
BEDERMAN, supra note 67 at 140; D’AMATO, supra note __, at 68; L. Oppenheim,
The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 331-333
(1908).
115
BEDERMAN, supra note __, at 140; Ellen Hey, The UN at Sixty: Celebration or
Wake?, 2 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 5, 23 & n.140 (2005).
116
Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of
International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. OF INT'L STUDIES 133,
134 (2001) (positive acts of sovereign consent, evidenced explicitly in treaty law and
implicitly in customary international law" are the foundation for international law); See
generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW
OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 19 (James Brown Scott ed. & Gwladys I. Williams trans., The
Clarendon Press 1950) (1604); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 n.28
(1952); G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the
Problem of Enforcement MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956).
117
GUZMAN, supra note __, at 187-88; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity
in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 438-40 (1983).
113
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much less consent to it. Further, a state’s implied consent under customary
international law is functionally irrevocable, an odd result given that the
explicit consent model of treaties is almost always revocable.118 The resulting
fictional consent model undercuts the legitimacy, and thus the potential of
customary law without providing any conceptual or practical benefit. Under
modern customary law, there is no belief that consent must be proven
independently of the substantive requirements for customary international law
formation for a state to be bound.119 It is sufficient for consent to be
circumstantially proven through the practice and opinio juris of other states.120
3. The Flaws of Non-Empirically Grounded Custom
There is consensus that the most pressing criticism of modern CIL is
its reflection of “ideal, rather than actual, standards of conduct.”121 One
commentator recently referred to the content of modern CIL as a “matter of
taste.”122 This perspective flows from the reality that modern CIL formation
is based on normative sources and justified on normative propositions. 123
Public declarations by states indicate a normative position of those officials

118

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 65, 67, 68, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 34 (1995); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1846-47, 1850. While
the implied consent cannot be generally withdrawn, oddly, a state’s consent can be vitiated by
explicit consent to a treaty rule that would otherwise violate a customary rule. See id.
119
D’AMATO, supra note __, at 187-99; LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 12324, 749-52 (2d ed. 1961); K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 160-68
(1964).
120
See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567, 575-78, 604-05, 622-23 (2005);
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Den. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶41-3 (Feb. 20); Case
Concerning the Delimination of the Maritime Line Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 94-96 (Jan. 20); Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v.
Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27-34 (June 3).
121
Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 A.J.I.L. 757, 769 (2001);
122
Id. at 780.
123
The normative emphasis of modern CIL is further complicated by the Western
ideological predispositions that, as a practical matter, carry tremendous influence in norm
generation. It has long been recognized that economic and militarily powerful states and
cultures, residing predominantly in the Western hemisphere, leave modern CIL norms
susceptible to charges of “normative chauvinism.” Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 1988-89 AUSTL.
Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 94.
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regarding either how they would like to see the content of international
custom or how they would like to be seen as acting.124
Perhaps best illustrating the aspirational nature of modern CIL is its
relationship with state practice. State practice is not eliminated in modern
CIL, but it’s relevance “diminishes as the normativity of the obligation
increases, such that customs on highly normative issues like human rights” are
considered binding even when actual state practice bears little resemblance to
the rule articulated.125 As such, state practice is considered an important
component in assessing traditional areas of international regulations, such as
the seizure of fishing vessel in time of war considered in Paquette Habana.
This disparity demonstrates two interrelated points. First, the sliding scale
recognizes that empirical grounding in state practice strengthens the validity
of a CIL norm. Second, where empirical grounding is difficult to identify, or
where the empirics might suggest the invalidity of the rule, they are discarded
in favor of the moral imperative underlying the promulgation of the rule.
While the theory of modern CIL differentiates itself from the traditional
conception in hopes of foregoing difficult state practice questions, its
continuing reliance on isolated experts, coupled with its moralistic bent,
exacerbates the legitimacy questions posed under the original formulation.
B.

Finding Custom Through Networked Knowledge

A year after Dr. Greenwald’s letter to The New England Journal of
Medicine, doctors Hangwi Tang and Jennifer Ng examined the efficacy of
Google search in independently identifying diagnoses.126 Drs. Tang and Ng
took all of the diagnostic cases presented in the NEJM during the 2005
calendar year and selected three to five search terms from each case to submit
to the search engine. They found that Google correctly identified the

124

President Bush’s repeated statements that the United States does not engage in
torture represent an obvious example. See Marc Santora, McCain’s Stance on Torture
Becomes Riveting Issue in Campaign, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 16, 2007 at p. 30.
125
Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasian in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The
Dual Role of States, 104 AJIL 179, 206 (2010).
126
See Hangwi Tang and Jennifer Hwee Kwoon Ng, “Googling for a diagnosis – use
of Google as a diagnostic aid: internet based study,” 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1143 (2006).
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diagnosis in 58% of the cases, startling close to the accuracy rate in a similar
study testing the accuracy of emergency room physicians.127
Over the past six years, the internet has sharpened its diagnostic skills.
In 2006, when the Tang and Ng study was performed a search “diagnosis” had
to be divined assessing the uniformity of one’s search results. On February
13, 2012, Google announced it would more explicitly offer its diagnostic
opinion. Now “when you search for a symptom or set of symptoms” you are
provided with a list of health conditions that may be causing those
symptoms.128 The site creates its suggestions of possible illness by cross
referencing the search data typically used by individuals researching a
symptom and the conditions those billions of users tied to those symptoms.
The medical profession is in little danger of extinction, but in the seven years
since Dr. Greenwald’s letter, his fear of an autonomous “Google
diagnostician” has become much closer to reality.
The Google diagnosis phenomenon is only one example of the
transformation of data into operational knowledge being utilized by
corporations, non-governmental organizations, and the state. Business
entities, early adopters in the area use “predictive analytics” to determine
whether you are pregnant and thus amenable to a discount on diapers.129
Public service organizations like the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s
“Program on Crisis Mapping and Early Warning” work to predict human
rights violations by identifying the precursors to such actions such as unusual
127

Id. See also Richard Krause, Ronald Moscati, Shravanti Halpern, Diane G.
Schwartz, and June Abbas, “Can Emergency Medicine Resident Reliably Use the Internet to
Answer Clinical Questions?” 12 WEST. J. EMERG. MED. 442-447 (2011). Interestingly, other
studies have indicated that specially designed medical study search engines (such as PubMed)
are no more effective than general search engines like Google and that, in fact, Google is used
more frequently by medical professionals. See Robert H. Thiele, Nathan C. Poiro, David C.
Scalzo and Edward C. Nemergut, “Speed, accuracy, and confidence in Google, Ovid,
PubMed, and UpToDate: results of a randomised trial,” 86 POSTGRAD MED. J. 1018 (2010).
128
See Roni Zeiger, “Improving health searches, because your health matters,”
INSIDE SEARCH: THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, February 13, 2012 (available at
http://insidesearch.blogspot.com /2012/02/improving-health-searches-because-your.html); see
also “Dr. Google Will See You Now: Search Can Identify Causes of Health Symptoms,”
MASHABLE BLOG, February 15, 2012 (available at http://mashable.com/2012/02/14/googlehealth-search/?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Mashable+%28Mashable%29).
129
Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets,” The New York Times,
February 16, 2012.
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governmental activity in certain areas of unstable states through the use of
imaging and crowdsourcing technologies.130 In government, the Central
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Intelligence and the U.S. Department
of Defense have engaged in dramatic investments to mine “open source
intelligence”, including social networking sites to “quickly vet, identify, and
geo-locate breaking events, incidents, and emerging threats.”131
These examples, spanning multiple industries, methodologies, and
aims are unified by transforming isolated pieces of information created
passively and openly produced online into knowledge enabling subsequent
action by it users, whether they be business, the state, or an individual seeking
medical treatment.
The goals of such projects are not new. Human rights advocates have
always sought to uncover government action and human rights abuses in order
to predict or combat them as much as corporations have engaged in
demographic research to engage in price discrimination. In the past, however,
such groups simply lacked the resources to achieve these goals (assuming the
information was available at all).
Below, I discuss the crucial features of successfully determining a
networked knowledge applicable to CIL formation.
The awareness and
understanding of these features can assist future scholarship in assessing the
accuracy of specific applied methodologies.
Such methodologies,
emphasizing networked knowled, should enable CIL to recapture responsivity
and enable future scholarship to reach the luxury exercised by scholars in
economics – debating the scope and nature of exceptions rather than very
existence of the rule. The principles below do not embrace a specific
methodology but are intended as a platform by which future scholars consider
specific methodologies of CIL formation through mining networked
information.
1. Social Epistemology and Networked Knowledge
130

Steve Lohr, “Online Mapping Shows Potential to Transform Relief Efforts,” THE
NEW YORK TIMES, March 28, 2011 at p. 3.
131
Jason Koebler, “FBI Wants to Monitor Social Media for ‘Emerging Threats,’”
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 27, 2012; see also Ellen Nakashima, “Social media
monitoring concerns civil libertarians,” THE WASHINGTON POST, January 14, 2012 at p. A3.
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Both the traditional and modern conceptions of CIL are reliant on the
knowledge ascertained by individual experts (principally scholars and jurists)
or small, institutional groups of experts (such as the ILC).132 This reliance
mirrors the historic reality that the epistemic process of acquiring knowledge
was best accomplished through individual expert works.133
The dissipating force of the traditional methodology of CIL formation
was caused by the inability to convincingly capture the truth of the empirical
proposition set before them. Over time, the proliferation of information on the
practices of states simultaneously made a “full” examination of state practice
highly burdensome. The increased skepticism of the public and fellow experts
over the course of history, due in part to the greater access to information
made empirical treatments of state practice increasingly vulnerable to
criticism of malfeasance when material would, inevitably, be excluded or
missed.134
In contrast, under modern CIL formation the normative framework is,
by design, a relativistic one. Specifically, the judgments justifying favoring
opinio juris over actual practice was based on contextual precepts regarding
rights, sovereignty, culture, and law that are fundamentally post-modern.
Such judgments are not only likely to vary dramatically between nations,
economic classes, and political persuasions they are highly informed by the
institutions and company that formed them.135 As a result the legal judgments
that birth modern CIL are highly insulated from external forces and influenced
by the acculturative forces of internal relationships.136
The relativistic and empirical shortcomings of modern and traditional
conceptions of CIL formation can be only be overcome by ensuring, through
showing the justifiability of inferences of observable facts, that assertions of
CIL formation are known, not simply desired. One step removed from that
132

See DAVID WEINBERGER, TOO BIG TO KNOW: RETHINKING KNOWLEDGE NOW
THAT THE FACTS AREN'T THE FACTS, EXPERTS ARE EVERYWHERE, AND THE SMARTEST
PERSON IN THE ROOM IS THE ROOM (2012).
133
Id. at 119-125.
134
BEDERMAN, supra note __, at 145.
135
Id. at 158.
136
See Goodman and Jinks, supra note __ at 188 (discussing acculturative forces in
international law compliance).
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which is empirically proven, knowledge requires the creation of justifiable
true belief. 137 Thus, the conversion of information into knowledge requires
the capability to possess sufficient information to justify one’s belief in the
underlying proposition. For purposes of CIL, “knowing” customary law
requires the information to justify one’s belief that the rule fulfills the
doctrinal requirements of state practice and opinio juris.
Social epistemology examines the epistemic properties of discerning
the ways of knowing societal truths that may not be observable.138 Traditional
epistemology has long focused on the question of the individual processes of
the rational mind to reach true, justified, belief. In contrast, social
epistemology goes beyond the heuristics of the individual to examine the best
processes and the advantages of networks.139 While traditional epistemic
questions examine the individual search for knowledge for those intending to
have an effect within society, social epistemic work goes in reverse asking
how a socially networked society can bring knowledge about individual
facts.140
Within social epistemology there exists a further refinement in
converting information to knowledge through networked interaction: network
epistemology. General social epistemology remains tied to preconceived
notions that do not translate easily within cultures. Network epistemology
eschews anthropocentric notions in favor of a neutral empirical grounding that
justifies broader knowledge. A simple example of this phenomenon is
illustrated through knowledge ascertained through belief. When an internet
search engine is used to search for information online, the result, processed
through the engine’s algarythmic code can reasonably lead to the conclusion
that the results represent several of the most relevant websites for each search
made.141
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See MARK VAN HOECKE, LAW AS COMMUNICATION 14 (2002); Anthony
D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law? 79 N.W. U.L. REV. 1293, 1312-1313 (1984).
138
Id. at 266.
139
See Adrian Vermeule, Many-minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2009).
140
Id. at 7.
141
See Paul Humphreys, Network Epistemology, EPISTEME (2009) at 221.
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Tied to the principles animating and justifying CIL, knowledge
regarding the fulfillment (or non-fulfillment) of CIL formation doctrine can be
ascertained if the information produced by networked societies provides
strongly probative justification that states, in fact, are engaged in state practice
and possess opinio juris sufficient to trigger the universally binding nature
inherent to CIL. Similarly, the empirically grounded and observable nature of
the inferences providing justification subsequently revitalize CIL by
reinstating it’s authority to possess its universally binding character.
Even in a world of identifiable, perfectly objective experts, what
experts know represents the faintest of shadows relative to the knowledge
dispersed in society at large. As a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, at the
time he wrote the opinion in The Paquette Habana over a century ago Justice
Gray only had the ability to access a tiny fraction of the information available
to any internet user today. The amount of information created, consumed, and
accessible online today is staggering. Each day more than 294 billion emails
are sent, 864,000 hours of video (98.6 years worth) is uploaded to YouTube,
and users consume enough information to fill 168,000,000 DVDs.142 The
amount of user-created content is just as mind boggling. According to Eric
Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google, internet users create as much
information online as was generated in all other forms from the beginning of
the world to 2003.143
The quantity is staggering. But the quantity of information produces is
simply a byproduct of the technological architecture of networked technology
that has had revolutionary effects. The “series of changes in the technologies,
economic organization, and social practices of production,” writes Professor
Yochai Benkler affecting “how we make and exchange information,
knowledge and culture.”144 The networking of content production provides
142

Matt Silverman, A Day in the Life of the Internet, MASHABLE (March 6, 2012)
http://mashable.com/2012/03/06/one-day-internet-data-traffic/.
143
Kenny MacIver, Google Chief Eric Schmidt on the Data Explosion, GLOBAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE CIO (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.i-cio.com/blog/august-2010/ericschmidt-exabytes-of-data ( “between the birth of the world and 2003 and 2003 there were five
exabytes of information created. We now create five exabytes every two days.” quoting Eric
Schmidt, CEO, Google).
144
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
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tremendous pieces of information with various curatorial processes integrated
within the very context through which content is produced.
The recent rise of the “wealth of networks” has created a multitude of
methods for producing knowledge. Examples abound. In 2009, search
aggregation (the practice of aggregating and comparing the use of search
words across the world) saved lives by tracking the spread of the H1N1 flu
pandemic faster and more accurately than the Center for Disease Control.145
Encyclopedia publishers have long stressed the accuracy of their material, but
mass independent collaboration devices like Wikipedia have been empirically
shown to possess equivalent accuracy while possessing more than 50 times
more material.146 Prediction markets are markets in which prices are set
relative to betting activity regarding the occurrence of an even in the future.
In 2008, such market outperformed all major polls and mechanisms averaging
such polls, missing Barack Obama’s margin in the Electoral College by a
single point.147
While the volume of information available is a necessary precursor to
networked knowledge, the conversion from information to knowledge would
remain impossible without a way to identify the indicia of the fact sought, and
the ability to aggregate that indicia from the information dispersed throughout
the network.148 Collectively, the endeavor of using technology to cull
knowledge from networked information is properly classified as network
epistemology.149
2. Knowledge, Numbers, and Diversity
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Jeremy Ginsberg, Matthew H. Mohebbi, et. al., Detecting influenza epidemics
using search engine query data, NATURE (2009) at 457. See also, Andrea Freyer Dugas, YuHsiang Hsieh, et al., Google Flue Trends: Correlation with Emergency Department Influenza
Rates and Crowding Metrics, 10 CLIN. INFECT. DIS. 1093 (2012) (confirming accuracy and
speed).
146
Jim Giles, Internet encyclopaedias go head to head, NATURE, 438, 900–901
(2005) (comparing Wikipedia to Encyclopedia Brittanica).
147
Alvin I. Goldman, Systems Oriented Social Epistemology, OXFORD STUDIES IN
EPISTEMOLOGY (2009).
148
The specific examples outlined above should not be read to the exclusion of other
similarly positioned mechanisms such as crowdsourcing and open source production.
149
See Weinberger, supra note __ at 245-49.
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The unifying feature of collective intelligence theory is that groups of
decision-makers make better, more accurate judgments than do individuals,
even when the individuals in question are experts.150 Aggregated digital data
is not only likely to provide new information for customary international law
formation, but more accurate information. The origin of customary law, in
both the domestic and international sphere, owes much to the notion that
practices are likely to reflect the reasoned judgments of community
members.151
Modern economics serves as an instructive example. A basic
economic premise of economics is that the information relevant to individual
economic decisions exists only in dispersed, incomplete, and often contrary
fragments scattered across, and residing within, a society.152 Even the most
dedicated central planners could not gather all of the information that make up
the market pricing system.153 When government misjudges a fixed price too
low (a ceiling price), the goods affected disappear from public vendors, are
sold selectively to preferred customers, and a black market appears where the
desired goods are sold at above ceiling (and sometimes above market) prices.
When the government’s price is too high (a floor price) there is excess supply,
retailers are uninterested in purchasing from suppliers, the government is
often forced to purchase the excess supply, and producers sell for a loss in
parallel markets.
Market pricing represents Creating an independent mechanism
consolidating this fragmented information in order to create an optimal
distribution of goods that reflects the collective intelligence of the market.154
In short, the sampling of large numbers of participants creates an empirically
observable and normatively desirable result. It is empirically observable as
you track the aggregation of the numbers. It is normatively desirable because
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See Adrian Vermeule, Many-minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2009).
151
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 75-76 (2000).
152
Thomas Piketty, The information-aggregation approach to political institutions,
43 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 791, 792 (1999).
153
The prevalence of illegal markets and surplus products evidence such failures.
154
Id. at 794.
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the final result “tracks the truth” better than any materially smaller group
attempting the same task. 155
Democratic theory reflects a similar wisdom.156 Democracy is not
only desirable due to the provision of procedural fairness, but based on
substantial evidence that democracy “tracks the truth”, leading to not only a
fair outcome, but a correct one.157 The epistemic value of democracy is
embodied in the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The “Law of Large Numbers”
posits the simple rule that as the size of sample group grows expectations and
actual occurrences tend to converge.158
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is the sociological extension of the Law
of Large Numbers relative to group knowledge.159 The Jury Theorem asserts
that when members of a group choose between two alternatives, as the size of
the group increases, “the probability that a majority vote of the group is
correct tends towards certainty” so long as systemic bias doesn’t compromise
the result.160 In other words, larger groups perform better than smaller groups,
while smaller groups perform better than individuals.
The superior accuracy of group judgments over individuals asserted by
the Jury Theorem is based upon the individual strands of knowledge held by
individuals coming into sharper focus due to the cancellation of individual
biases in-group decisions. Individuals never have perfect information when
making judgments or even speak on facts. The experience gathered by
individuals over time is further nuanced by context.
155

John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008).
156
John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008).
157
See David Estlund, “Making Truth Safe for Democracy,” in THE IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY (eds. David Copp, Jean Hampton and John Roemer) (1993) at 71-79.
158
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 97 (2008); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1803; Fernando Teson,
Defending International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 87, 89-91 (2005).
159
Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, A survey of the principles
underlying the Draft Constitution (1792) translated and excerpted in: McLean and Hewitt at
190-220 (1994).
160
Id. at 233.
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The corresponding nature of the size of the group and valid judgment
flows from the fact that larger groups are more likely to represent a more
heterogeneous sample. As the heterogeneity of the group increases, the more
likely it is that they will be negatively correlated, thus reducing the error value
of the group’s final determination.
In other words, the size of the group is, in a way, a proxy for the
existence of epistemic diversity. The accuracy of the group is directly related
to the correlation of biases throughout the group. In small groups, strong
biases of individuals can strongly skew the accuracy of the group’s collective
judgment. As the group grows, strong biases in any direction are offset by
equally strong biases in opposite directions. Together, the noise of false bias
is cancelled out.
Absent the normative methodology of modern CIL, the original
conception of customary law is not only amenable, but classically designed to
incorporate the democratic gains of large, diverse numbers.
The
“antidemocratic” character of CIL is a concern repeatedly expressed by
skeptics of customary law.161 Modern CIL’s reliance on unelected scholars,
the focus on official statements, and the demise of the persistent objector
doctrine reinforce this critique.162
However, the antidemocratic elements of modern CIL are not endemic
to custom, but are tethered to its normative formulation and sourcing.163 The
development of customary law is quite populist in nature. In European civil
161

See Edward T. Swaim, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 627, 700 (2001) (noting that “[c]ustom’s critics increasingly stress its antidemocratic
elements.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971,
2017 (2004);. To the extent CIL is antidemocratic by usurping the domestic political
preferences of specific states there is no reason to believe that it does so in greater degree than
treaty formation. See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an
Outdated Concept, 97 A.J.I.L. 782, 783 (2003) (discussing “sovereign” treaty making).
162
Stephan, supra note __, at 245-48; Trimble, supra note __, at 717-23.
163
It is true that, at the domestic level, a networked CIL could be antidemocratic in
the strict sense. Where domestic populations are popularly opposed to a networked CIL norm
they could remain bound against their democratic wishes. This, of course, would only be
antidemocratic assuming that there did not exist either an overarching democratic
commitment to international law. Even in this circumstance, the flexibility provided by the
general maneuverability within IL generally (and particularly CIL) indicates that the depth of
this problem would not be substantial.
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law systems, the model for CIL, customary law was an unmistakably
democratic form of law making in a world otherwise dominated by the
monarch.164 For these systems, custom was “unofficial” law, in which the
practices of people were transformed and ultimately enforced by the governor,
even though he had no role in creating it.165
3. Adaptable Aggregation.
The accessibility of information itself does not necessarily create the
reasonable belief of truth necessary to create knowledge. An information pool
used to distill reliable networked knowledge must be able to isolate and
aggregate the expressions relevant to the knowledge sought and be
continuously refreshed. A vast internet of websites is worth little absent an
ability to efficiently search that information to cull the material you are
seeking.166 Similarly, once organized, the value of information online would
grow stale quickly without the ability to quickly incorporate and utilize newly
created information. The ability to gather relevant information on a
continuously renewed basis represents adaptable aggregation.
The civil law origin of customary law represents a foundation in
“evolutionary aggregation.”167 At the time of the inception of custom as a
source of law, converting longstanding practice into law was justified because
such practices have “stood the test of time” and thus, are properly considered
a reflection of the collective wisdom of multiple generations.168 Customary
164

Id. at 312.
See MARK VAN HOECKE, LAW AS COMMUNICATION 14 (2002); Anthony
D’Amato, Is International Law Really Law? 79 N.W. U.L. REV. 1293, 1312-1313 (1984).
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Even with all of the information present on the internet the Harvard Humanitarian
Initiative project crowdsourcing satellite imagery would be useless if it was unable to gain
access to such imagery or if it had no understanding by which to analyze the images it
possesses.
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See Kyung-Joong Kim and Sung Bae Cho, Evolutionary aggregation and
refinement of Bayesian networks, IEEE CONGRESS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 2006,
pp. 1513-1520, 2006. While I prefer the “evolutionary aggregation” terminology, the concept
it encompasses is designed to include a host of similar arguments, most prominently, the
Burkean perspective regarding the value of tradition.
168
See Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism before the
Constitution, 1998 U. Ill. L. rev. 173, 188 (1998); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Tension Between
legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law, 33 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 131, 135 (2005);
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (1992) (regarding custom and efficiency).
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practices provide guidance for the agnostic or clueless. For example, if you
become lost in a forest, discovering a trail of any significance provides create
solace because the path represents that many have gone before you down that
path. The simple fact of the past presence of such travelers is, in and of itself,
meaningless. The relief is the product of the highly reasonable belief that
those travelers were making their journey for the purpose of getting to a
destination. Through another reasonable inference, one can conclude that the
destination will have people present now that can assist you in a time of need.
At its inception, customary law’s dependence on unwritten rules
engendered legal change through an organic, decentralized communication of
content that favors overarching rules. As circumstances change customs shift
in corresponding measure. 169 As circumstances change, making an original
practice impossible or excessively impractical, community members
communicate as to the best available alternative typically hewing closely to
the preceding customary norm. 170 Custom’s reliance on communication, and
the fact that uncomplicated material is communicated (and understood) more
readily provides facilitate its adaptability and enable experimentation at levels
where greater detail may be required.
The recognition of customary law was a highly significant
advancement in law and cutting-edge in its day.171 The value of “tradition” as
a proxy of judgment, however, provides only a very rough notion of societal
knowledge and is prone to inertia.172 Once established, a variety of
conformity driving mechanisms, such as path dependency, erode custom’s
reflection of judgment.
169

ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 97 (2008); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note __, at 1803; Fernando Teson,
Defending International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 87, 89-91 (2005).
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Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control
Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1593 (1991).
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Id. at 1588.
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See e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and
Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 61-62 (1990). While articulating a
more affirmative role of individuals, Lung-chu Chen likewise asserts that citizens are already
accounted for “under the concept of ‘cutom’ that creates law through widely congruent
patterns of peoples’ behavior and other communications…”.
LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
80 (1989). For a general discussion of various challenges to the state-centric model of
consent and CIL formation in the literature, see Ochoa, supra note 109, at 142-148.
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I MPACT

The final aspect examined relates to the impact of a “networked
knowledge” approach to CIL formation within the larger international system.
To be sure, the final impact can only be discerned relative to innumerable
other legal regime questions. However, there are three distinct and direct
consequences.
A. International Personality
Under traditional notions of international law, only states were
governed by international law and the regulatory subject matter of the field
was correspondingly limited.173 Only quintessential transnational activity (i.e.
armed conflict, trade) and sovereignless areas (the high seas) were regulated.
Since World War II, the jurisdictional scope of international law has
expanded dramatically. International human rights moved international law
past the sovereign boundary by governing purely domestic action. 174 The
imposition of international criminal liability decisively declared individuals
subject to international legal punishment, but without a role in the formation
of such rules.175
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John. P. Humphrey, The Revolution oin the International Law of Human Rights, 4
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1974-1975); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 158-59 (2007-2008).
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Professor Paust invokes General Assembly resolutions as an ideal source of
evidence regarding public opinion. Paust, supra note __, at 75-77. Ochoa argues that
discerning the content of individual expectations should be more holistically attained citing
NGOs, General Assembly resolutions, domestic legal instruments and public polling efforts.
Ochoa, supra note __, at 176-186.
175
Ochoa, supra note __, at 153, 158. “If this assumption [that states were exclusive
subjects under international law] ever was a realistic description of international law, it no
longer is.” Id. at 152. The post-War Geneva Conventions established a substantially higher
standard of individual protections. See e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, August 6, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Similarly, the Nuremberg trials provided the philosophy and nascent
framework of international criminal law. Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of
Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 918 (2009).
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The undesirable asymmetry of imposing liability on individuals
without providing a corresponding role in the law formation process has
sparked a search for “bottom-up lawmaking” through the inclusion of
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs,176 or new categories of law
formation that are more individually oriented.177 In the best of scenarios, the
use of such proxies seems unlikely to accomplish more than substituting the
judgments of one imperfect proxy with that of another.178 In the worst
scenarios, the public and politically accountable proxy of the state is dislodged
by unaccountable actors with specialized policy investments. Professor
Christiana Ochoa sharpened these normative intuitions into a direct call for
formal incorporation of individuals in the doctrine of customary international
law formation through methods such as surveys.179
A move toward a collection of individual expression through
networked technology provides a reliable theoretical framework for direct and
uninvasive opportunity for the expressions of individuals to not only reflect
custom, but to actively participate in its creation and alteration. The volume
of expressions that create networked knowledge are both difficult to
manipulate and far more resistant to special interest capture. 180
B. A Useful Platform for Principled Hierarchies of Norms
176

See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The
Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 213 (1991).
177
See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
178
See LEPARD, supra note __, at 33 & 209 n.6; Kal Raustiala, The ‘Participatory
Revolution’ in International Environmental Law, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 537, 564, 573
(1997).
179
See Ochoa, supra note __, at 142-48.
180
See Cass R. Sunstein, Idealogical Amplification, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 273, 274
(2007) (discussing ideological amplification and suppression among like-minded groups).
The inclusion of NGOs and General Assembly resolutions exemplifies a normative
predisposition of the idealism critique that has dogged modern customary law. The peculiar
dynamics of the UN General Assembly appear more representative of the insularity of
international organizations than the world populace. Similarly, even an intensive effort to
include a broad variety of NGOs with a variety of perspectives would not resolve the force of
self-selection that nurtures the growth and make-up of such organizations. Nor does it seem
plausible that international scholars and officials that hold such sway in identifying or
codifying customary international law would welcome organizations representing positions
broadly unpopular among their ranks (e.g. socially conservative, anarchic, religious,
libertarian).
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As noted by Professors Jack Goldsmith and Darryl Levinson, modern
international law lacks “centralized, hierarchical ordering” that results in
“struggles to coordinate public understandings of the content and application
of its norms.”181 In large part, the coordination problem Goldsmith and
Levinson cite, is a by-product of the unobservable and normative nature of
modern CIL. Unable to provide a convincing gauge (in quantity or quality) of
relevant CIL formation elements, modern CIL rules are usually placed on the
same uncertain footing. 182
Modern CIL is binary. Generally, under current doctrine, once a norm
has “hardened” into customary law it possesses the same force and
establishment of all other such rules.183
Networked CIL formation would
provide granular detail. Networked knowledge will provide fine grained
detail of differentiations between the volume of state practice across multiple
norms. Just as soft law has provided an opportunity to create international
rules exerting exclusively political force, the provision of substantial data
undergirding networked CIL may provide soft CIL – perhaps not universally
binding, but reflecting the influence of identified best practices across
multiple states. In short, the depth offered by networked CIL formation can
serve as a method by which international law can reclaim a framework of the
“hierarchical ordering” necessary to effective governance.
D.

The Normative Value of Accuracy
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Theoretical changes and proposals to customary international law
formation have mostly been permeated with a scholarly assessment of
normative value judgments as to the “best” content of international law norms
and asserting pragmatic gains as an ancillary benefit. This work has played a
major role in the expansion of international law.
It is a necessary concession to note that, under a networked CIL
approach, the substantive scope of CIL would change in ways that many
international law scholars might find disturbing.184 The law that remains,
however, should possess greater legitimacy, enforceability, and clarity.
Further, major elements of legal regime design do not operate in isolation.
Legitimacy enhancements within one realm tend to emanate crossover
benefits. Within the international legal system, treaty instruments are most
likely to be the ultimate beneficiaries. CIL with greater clarity and authority
will ease the burden of treaty instruments, offsetting some of the costs
associated with treaty alteration. Relatedly, CIL filling the gaps between
treaties should similarly enhance the legitimacy of treaties by discouraging the
stretching of treaty provisions beyond their anticipated application.
CONCLUSION
Networking customary law answers the most substantial challenges
facing modern CIL formation, reinstating CIL as a responsive body of law
capable to answer the challenges of our contemporary, globalized society. In
addition to avoiding the harms inherent to modern CIL’s normative emphasis,
reinstating an empirically oriented and high-resolution vehicle for law
formation will provide an observable, quantifiable foundation of accuracy that
not only has the chance to enhance the authority of CIL but also to
reinvigorate the system’s entire infrastructure.
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In relation to some shifts, I am likely to be included among such scholars.
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